In 1998, South Africa established official relations with the People’s Republic of China, thus opening up a new era of opportunity between two very different countries. This complex relationship has at times complicated international politics, embraced a shared ideology and increased commercial opportunities.

In a recent webinar hosted by the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria, four experts on the relationship between the two countries shared their thoughts on the complexities and paradoxes that underlie and infuse this multifaceted affiliation. Prof Chris Alden, Dr Yu-Shan Wu, Dr Garth le Pere and Dr Yazini April discussed a range of topics, which included the following key themes:

1. The history of the relationship between South Africa and China
2. The role of non-state actors in South Africa-China relations
3. The geo-economic fault lines that affect South Africa-China relations

Historical context

Each South African administration has shaped the relationship between the two countries to reflect their own political and economic priorities. Between 1998 and 2008, Presidents Mandela and Mbeki purported to foster strategic cooperation between the two countries. According to Prof Alden, these two administrations interacted with China, but at a distance. This was not necessarily out of a lack of interest, but rather because those administrations were working towards establishing the strategic autonomy of a newly democratic South Africa. In 2009, under the Zuma administration, which is also known for its corruption, South Africa’s relationship with China moved to become a more comprehensive strategic partnership with a mutually beneficial trade structure and ministerial-level participation in regional associations such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and FOCAC (the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation), and was often a backdrop to domestic politics. While the opposition may have complained about SA’s relations with China, their criticism was often indirectly aimed at South African leaders and how they handled issues. Chinese actors have been found on both sides. Some Chinese companies have been involved in some of the state capture cases, but there are also Chinese diplomats and companies who will not approve loans if in their opinion projects are mismanaged.  

As Dr Wu argued, these incidents provoke a number of interesting questions: To what degree does the corruption in South Africa involve China? How concerned is China about corruption in South Africa? Will China’s concerns affect her level of investment in South Africa? What is President Ramaphosa doing to balance this particular paradox?

The role of non-state actors in South Africa-China relations

The relationship between the two countries is often influenced by different dynamics. Victoria Graham, Head of UP’s Department of Political Sciences, raised an interesting concern about the role non-state actors play in influencing the relationship between the two countries. This prompted a detailed discussion on the value trade unions place on engaging with China—the private sector has contributed to growing foreign investment in South Africa despite the apparent corruption. Dr Wu pointed out that although South Africa hosts a larger Chinese population that any other African country, there is still no complete understanding of how the Chinese community in South Africa influences the relationship between the two countries. As this discussion developed, the audience learnt how globalisation affects South African-Chinese identity formation and how transnational actors accelerate or slow down this political and economic relationship. This gives rise to the question about who actually controls the South Africa-China relationship.

*Geo-economic fault lines

The geo-economic position of China in 2009 is vastly different from that in 2021. China is no longer an emerging power, but has become a global power. Currently she is experiencing a decline in demand for raw materials. Her sophisticated ecosystem is progressively characterised by the 4th Industrial Revolution and focuses on developments in the areas of robotics and technology. To keep pace, South Africa, according to Dr Le Pere, needs to develop an ‘asymmetric adaptation to power’. In other words, the political, economic and social spheres of South Africa need to make themselves relevant to China’s 4IR ecosystem. Furthermore, as highlighted by Dr April, South Africa needs to be clear about what she wants to gain from her relationship with China. South Africa will remain in the commoditised periphery if no effort is made to enhance her industrialisation. This means that South Africa will need to define a comprehensive strategic relationship with the global power while building her own economic and knowledge base.

*This entire webinar was based on the book South Africa-China relations: A partnership of paradoxes, edited by Prof Chris Alden and Dr Yu-Shan Wu, which is now available from Amazon and Palgrave Macmillan Books.