There is no gainsaying the basic truth that South Africa is critically dependent on the outside world for creating the type of economic conditions needed to defuse the ticking time bomb of unemployment, poverty, inequality and rising expectations that threatens our future.
Unfortunately, the economic diplomacy of which the department speaks seems to be more of aspiration than reality.
On the one hand, the country does not have the right kind of professional diplomats in the field to make economic diplomacy work. On the other hand, such a policy is seriously undermined by the narrow-minded ideological predilections of key decision makers in other government departments.
What African National Congress activist Mamphela Ramphele termed "inappropriate struggle ideology", plus a heavy dose of anachronistic Marxist-Leninist doctrines, continues to dominate the thinking and policies of these ideologues, who seem to have a veto on government policies.
Traction, and legitimacy to their points of view, are nowadays being added by South Africa’s stance in the north-south dichotomy, its western-scepticism, and particularly its membership of the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China and SA) grouping.
The latest example of myopic dominance of ideology over national interest is the cancellation of bilateral investment treaties with European Union (EU) member states.
This move signals potentially harmful animosity towards the EU, denying its pivotal importance for South Africa’s economic wellbeing. What is being tested here is South Africa’s relationship with its most important economic and developmental partner in a global context.
The importance of the EU-SA relationship is overwhelmingly clear.
The EU is not only South Africa’s (and Africa’s) single biggest foreign-aid donor, but it accounts for 80% of South Africa’s foreign direct investment (34% of gross domestic product in 2010) and accounts for 30% of its trade.
This outstrips the trade and investment contribution of South Africa’s preferred ideological partners — China, Russia and Brazil — by a wide margin.
Apparently this empirical reality seems of little or no consequence to South Africa’s blinkered ideologues. The cancellation of the bilateral investment treaties is part of a pattern that has come a long way. A "keep Europe at arm’s length" attitude was there since diplomatic relations started in 1994.
Deliberately, it seems, the new government gave scant recognition to the EU’s substantial efforts to help rebuild post-apartheid SA. Apart from donating liberal aid to the victims of apartheid, it entered into the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement with South Africa in 1999, followed up by a mutually beneficial formal strategic partnership and joint action plan in 2007.
Strangely, the relationship never became special or close. The Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement negotiations took many years to complete, hampered at times by an acrimonious, competitive contest and one-upmanship.
Ideology already clouded the relationship back then.
South Africa, conscious of its new Afrocentric, anticolonial and western-sceptic credentials, was determined not to be seen as being in cahoots with the EU.
A clinical business-like relationship, rather than the "special relationship" the EU was keen to establish, came about.
This is not to say that the EU is without blame. Self-interest, particularly in trade negotiations, damaged mutual trust, even causing some bad blood.
All along, there seemed to be two EUs to deal with: a benevolent EU and a self-interested, self-serving EU. But, in the end, despite muddy patches, the relationship was hugely beneficial for SA, giving credence to the wisdom of economic diplomacy.
It is now clear that the relationship has come under new stress due to SA’s ideological interests. The local head of the EU delegation pointedly told SA to "resist the notion it did not need Europe". A strong statement indeed, particularly for an EU diplomat.
What the ambassador spoke about may not be a far-fetched scenario.
The ideologues, no doubt emboldened by recent developments such as South Africa’s Brics membership, its role as a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the financial crises in Europe and the US and Goldman Sachs’s predictions of the decline of the West and the rise of China as dominant world power, seem to believe in a future world without the West.
They base their analysis on the "inevitability" of the future dominance of the "global south", Brics’s control of the international financial and diplomatic agenda and the irreversible rise of China. Of course, a new foreign policy orientation makes good sense for South Africa, given its postapartheid Afrocentric identity, its place in the developing world and south-south credentials.
But does South Africa’s foreign policy need to be driven by an ideological zero-sum approach based on what seems to be a faulty analysis of current international relations?
There is nothing inevitable about a western decline or China’s imminent ascendency to replace US dominance; the jury is still out on Brics (while the Group of 20 is more representative as well as legitimate in the international context). Moreover, the type of alliance (balance of power) politics Brics pursues, with SA in tow, smacks of anachronistic 19th-and 20th-century stuff.
A reality that also cannot be overlooked is that multilateralism, globalisation, interdependence, inclusiveness and economic diplomacy increasingly dominate the international scene.
According to the Paris-based Institute for Strategic Studies, "all major powers are exposed to the unprecedented conjunction of the economic, energy and environmental crisis and none of them can successfully confront these challenges on its own".
South Africa will ignore these realities only to its own detriment, as it also seems to be doing in the case of the EU and the West in general. In the end, the ideological dominance of national interest may result in South Africa losing its foreign policy independence and cutting edge, becoming the captive ally of its powerful Brics partners — China in particular.
The Dalai Lama issue, in which South Africa refuse him a visa, already showed the extent to which South Africa is in China’s pocket.
An inclusive but realistic and independent foreign policy is called for if SA is to maximise its national interest.
This article appeared in the Business Day of 15 October 2012
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