Since 1994, it has developed into a formidable bureaucratic apparatus. Planning and strategising has become a dominant pursuit. A plethora of "strategic plans" and "white papers" on foreign policy, articulating an array of objectives and strategies, have been churned out, scores of new missions opened worldwide, frequent high-level bilateral official visits paid, regular heads-of-mission and other conferences held….

All of these gave the impression of very active, hands-on, comprehensive foreign policy. To manage this operation, the department maintained about 150 diplomatic missions abroad, complemented by a huge personnel component at head office, costing taxpayers R5.27bn in 2012-13.

South Africans are entitled to have high expectations of this expensive operation. They may rightfully ask: where is the beef?

As chapter 7 of the National Development Plan (NDP), and other commentaries, confirm, the department’s elaborate bureaucratic infrastructure falls short when it comes to successful diplomacy in some critical areas.

While its routine diplomatic, protocol and consular work maintain good standards, the same cannot be said about its upper echelon’s resourcefulness, particularly its ability to deliver concrete results in critical foreign policy areas.

There is a yawning imbalance between the department’s input and output performance; between aspirations and goal-setting and concrete beneficial results. In the long list of "key priority areas" in the Strategic Plan OF 2010-13, "measurable objectives" are described in opaque terms such as "participate", "support", "engage", "advise", but not a word on concrete outcomes. As stated in the NDP: "South African diplomats have great skill in drafting memoranda of understanding, policy statements, and agreements but lose momentum when it comes to implementing … or following up." This leaves the impression that serving the bureaucratic machine, rather than getting it to deliver what is critically needed for the country, has become a major preoccupation.

The dominant features of the foreign policies initiated by former president Thabo Mbeki and continued by President Jacob Zuma are that South Africa must "punch above its weight" in external affairs, play a leading role in Africa via its "African agenda", prioritise South-South relations, be a leading reformer of the global economic and financial architecture, and take the lead in multilateral diplomacy. Hence, South Africa’s revisionist role in the United Nations (UN) and other forums, its efforts to lead and dominate the Africa Union, its membership of the Brics bloc of emerging countries and the Group of 20, peacekeeping efforts in Africa, siding with emerging nations in the "global South" and adopting a western-sceptic attitude at the behest of myopic ideologues in the tripartite alliance.

While ostensibly adding to the country’s prestige, the real, visible benefits of these moves have been disappointing.

These pursuits were really the easy part of the national foreign policy brief. After South Africa’s celebrated democratic transformation and the international rehabilitation that followed, they were almost there for the taking, not really requiring exceptional diplomatic skill. Yet, in terms of South Africa’s global competitiveness, power status and role, the country is worse off than before in some important areas.  Particularly alarming is that South Africa’s much-hailed continental potential, leadership and ascendancy are now being challenged by some of Africa’s "lions", especially Nigeria. One reason existing policies seem to have failed is that they had served the interests and prestige of the government and the alliance more than those of the country and the people.

The important question is, therefore, are South Africa’s national interests correctly interpreted and prioritised by its foreign policy?

It does not seem so. Most obviously needed to rectify the situation is erudite foreign policy leadership to reshape, rationalise, refocus and revitalise South Africa’s diplomacy. The lodestar should be the maximisation of real national interests, such as human security, national welfare, regional progress and stability, and enhancing international competitive power. Economic decline, mass poverty and unemployment, as well as regional failures continue to prevail and even escalate, compromising South Africa’s future role and status internationally. Dealing effectively with this situation should be the main concern of South Africa’s diplomacy. This means giving primacy to the domestic agenda, to economic/trade diplomacy and to strategic diplomatic excellence, instead of using scarce resources to pursue ephemeral, blue-sky stuff.

In practical terms, this translates into our diplomats becoming salesmen for South Africa, promoting external trade, securing more direct foreign investment, enhancing regional economic integration and co-operation, restoring South Africa’s influence, respect and leadership in Africa and in global politics, and projecting an independent, consistent, and predictable foreign policy. Of course, multilateral diplomacy will always remain important, but not as the be-all and end-all of our diplomacy.

Some of South Africa’s diplomatic deficiencies are clearly pointed out in chapter 7 of the NDP. It states, among other things, that the department should "focus on organisational transformation to make (it) more efficient and effective in its operations abroad internally and domestically". At present, innovative ability and high-level economic/trade/financial expertise are in short supply in the department, which is already overstaffed with generalists and incompetent and dysfunctional political deployees. As the NDP points out: "(South Africa’s) foreign relations are becoming … ineffective and the country is sliding down the scale of global competitiveness and overall moral standing."

The "Potemkin syndrome" is especially obvious in the government’s pious undertaking to commit itself to the moral leadership of Nelson Mandela. Lamentably, this seems to be blatant posturing, a display of pretentious morality, particularly demonstrated by its voting pattern in the UN, hobnobbing with totalitarian regimes, and turning a blind eye towards democratic and human rights aberrations in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. This contradicts everything the government pretends to stand for: our founding democratic principles and ideals and commitment to Mandela’s moral leadership.

That the government prefers to carry on as usual, has been confirmed by the Cabinet’s rejection (according to unconfirmed reports) of the NDP’s entire take on foreign policy. Apparently, vested interests took umbrage at the criticism and recommendations – among others that the department does not deliver as it should, that South Africa is slipping behind its international competitors, that an audit of South Africa’s 150 foreign missions is necessary and that diplomats’ salaries should be lowered.

A senior government source dismissed the NDP’s recommendations as "ignorant or naive", written by somebody "who knows nothing about South African foreign policy" (Business Day, June 11 2013). This is plain nonsense. Much of what the NDP recommends is reasonable and valid, needing serious reflection and debate instead of out-of-hand rejection. The deficiencies in critical areas are serious and cannot simply be swept under the carpet at the behest of vested interests and standpatters.

This article appeared in the Business Day of 4 March 2014