Earlier this month, former US president Jimmy Carter (1977-1980) turned 100. Though he won the Nobel prize in 2002 for his peacemaking efforts and promoting democracy, development and human rights, he should have been awarded the prize in 1978 for leading peacemaking efforts between Egypt and Israel. The award instead went jointly to Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and Israel’s Menachem Begin.

During 13 days of talks at the secluded American presidential retreat of Camp David outside Washington DC in September 1978, the distrust between both sides was palpable. Sadat and Begin were both stubborn and proud, believing they personified the national interest of their countries. This antagonism left Carter to conduct talks with both leaders separately, negotiating directly with key members of their teams.

Carter was the real architect of the Camp David accord. A former Sunday school teacher and Southern Baptist, he was the grand conductor of a complex, finely-tuned peace orchestra. Carter impressively mastered the details of his Middle East brief, and his stated commitment to pursuing a human rights-centred foreign policy forced him to focus on the plight of the Palestinians, though this obligation would ultimately be abandoned for a parochial Egypt-Israel peace.

He sought to reassure both Cairo and Tel Aviv by calmly explaining each of their problems to the other side. He acted as an impartial — rather than neutral — mediator, offering proposals that he felt were fair to both parties. But he was naive in assuming that the presence of the three leaders in the serene setting of Camp David would foster greater understanding by Sadat and Begin of each other’s positions.

In the end, after a stormy early meeting between leaders who despised each other, it was left to Carter to negotiate a text with key aides, which the Americans then tried to persuade both sides to accept.

Carter shuttled tirelessly between Begin and Sadat; used his personal relationship to pressure Begin and calm Sadat; worked adroitly with key actors from both sides to stitch together compromises; and even wrote the first draft of the Egyptian—Israeli peace treaty. The American president listened attentively, taking copious notes, having meticulously studied the maps before negotiations began.

He was also prepared to exert pressure on Israel by threatening that bilateral relations with Washington would be harmed by Begin’s obduracy, warning that he would expose Tel Aviv to the US Congress and world public opinion as the recalcitrant party that was obstructing the peace.

Before Camp David, Carter had persistently but unsuccessfully pressured Begin to surrender Israeli settlements in Sinai, and to agree to Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank. He shared Sadat’s exasperation with Begin, and both conspired, at one stage, to ambush Begin at Camp David with an agreement that would force the Israeli leader to face the public embarrassment of being the “spoiler” who did not want peace.

Carter’s personal relationship with Sadat was warmer than that with Begin, and they had immediately forged a close rapport from their first meeting in 1977. The US president would later describe Sadat as “a man whom I would come to admire more than any other leader”. In contrast, he regarded Begin as an inflexible ideologue who saw himself “cast in a biblical role as one charged with the future of God’s chosen people”.

Carter eventually revealed the existence of Sadat’s concessions to Begin, thus weakening Cairo’s negotiating position. Even so, Camp David was a personal peacemaking triumph for Carter.

Professor Adekeye Adebajo is a professor and senior research fellow at the University of Pretoria’s Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship.

This article was first published in the Business Day South Africa on 28 October 2024.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Pretoria