Opinion: ANC Must Rid Itself of Last Vestiges of Mbeki Era

Posted on May 11, 2012



When Zuma inherited the presidency, SA was in a tailspin. Mbeki left a country whose public mood was low and whose public institutions had been compromised. The discontent within the African National Congress (ANC) and the coalescing of counterfactions around Zuma were reinforced by increasing dissatisfaction with Mbeki’s leadership in society. Poor living conditions and slow delivery of municipal services were common features of Mbeki’s second term.

Why was Mbeki’s public leadership floundering? In their book, Judgment: how winning leaders make great calls, Noel Tichy and Warren Bennis point out that "the single most important thing that leaders do is to make good judgment calls". They note three crucial areas where such calls are needed: people, strategy and crisis.

Mbeki’s Achilles heel was his irredeemable judgment flaw. Bad judgment calls were evident in his Cabinet appointments, the running of state institutions and his response to crises, especially associated with the rotten defence procurement package, otherwise known as the arms deals.

Under him, public services performed dismally despite the professed commitment of the ANC to building a developmental state.

It was under Mbeki that cadre deployment based on party affiliation and loyalty was rife. The perennial battles between the directors-general and ministers sharpened under Mbeki. Home affairs had a succession of three directors-general, including former spies, in four years. So bored was one of them that he decided to run a basketball team from his office. Mbeki failed to bring innovation and to insist on high-calibre appointments in the public service. Instead, he allowed incapacitated ministers to remain in office until death intervened.

The list includes Manto Tshabalala-Msimang at health, Stella Sigcau at public works, and Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri at communications. Yet these were critical departments for enhancing the quality of SA’s healthcare system, improving infrastructure, and reducing the costs of doing business.

Mining, the backbone of SA’s economy, suffered neglect. It was presided over by a succession of incompetent ministers: Lindiwe Hendricks , Buyelwa Sonjica and Lulu Xingwana. Manufacturing too slowed down in the Mbeki era, with no clearly articulated plans on how to animate productivity, increase investment, and stimulate export growth. His celebrated stewardship of the economy is therefore an embellished myth.

Mbeki lacked a leader’s mettle to take big decisions. In weighing decisions, he worried more about party-political considerations or personal loyalty than what South Africans thought or felt. It took way too long for him to act on Zuma’s corruption allegations. His indecisiveness created a vacuum that was seized upon by the political factions that by then were turning nasty.

Like Zuma today, Mbeki had his own Richard Mdluli in former national police commissioner Jackie Selebi. He stubbornly defended Selebi against clear evidence of his association with the criminal underworld. It mattered very little to Mbeki that the chief of the prosecuting authority, Vusi Pikoli, had a warrant of arrest for Selebi based on evidence in his possession. Instead, Mbeki let the axe fall on Pikoli, a hardworking man known for his integrity.

Mbeki skillfully managed to outwit Democratic Alliance leader Helen Zille, and convinced her to trust him wholeheartedly on Selebi. In so doing, he preferred political craftsmanship over taking hard decisions and doing what was right. For Mbeki, Selebi was a "loyal and trusted cadre of the movement". That’s all that mattered.

By the time Zuma re-emerged as a political force, the national mood was at its lowest point. Trust in politics was in free fall and confidence about the future was dampened. The stage for Zuma’s meteoric rise was set.

Like the central character in Mary Shelley’s novel, Frankenstein, who was deeply cynical about humanity and turned loose upon society a monster that would wreak unstoppable havoc, Mbeki fo mented the climate that allowed Zuma to wrestle back power. Zuma is Mbeki’s political engineering gone wrong.

If the ANC is genuinely committed to bolstering the strength of our democracy, the quality of our institutions, and the character of the country’s leadership, it would begin by getting rid of the last vestiges of Mbeki’s Legacy — Jacob Zuma. Only then can the country start anew.

This article appeared in the Business Day of 11 May 2012.

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