HUMAN SECURITY AND THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE: TIME FOR A REAPPRAISAL

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Abstract

The article traces the unfolding of the human security agenda as the primary organising framework for constructing the security outlook of the South African military. Questions are raised about the utility of human security as a conceptual basis for thinking about and the construction of defence. Human security is historically contextualised within the security conceptualisations of the 1990s. Since then, however, various geo-strategic changes in the world necessitated a return to a more traditional outlook on security and strategy. This reality was also increasingly visible in South Africa's foreign policy approaches and, more specifically, the employment of its armed forces in Africa. The article concludes by arguing, firstly, that the South African armed forces did not at any time critically question how a military should be organised, trained, and equipped for human security operations and, secondly, that the South African National Defence Force never questioned its own operational deployments through the human security perspective.

1. Introduction

In a recent article in the Strategic Review for South Africa, Sandy Africa argues that the human security paradigm has not prevailed in South Africa and that it may even be a waning value in the South African political and social fabric. She questioned whether we are in fact "...seeing a reversal of gains, and the return of the traditional security ap-
approach that had characterised the *apartheid* years" (Africa 2015: 178). Africa questions whether the human security agenda has been lost in the quagmire of political, economic and social changes confronting South Africa and whether it is possible to arrest the trend. This article does not challenge her observation. Instead, the intention is to highlight that the human security agenda did prevail in the South African military as the primary conceptual framework for thinking about the purpose of defence and questions the utility thereof as a conceptual tool for a defence establishment.

Security paradigms and threat perceptions drive the security and defence planning processes — directly or indirectly in a more oblique manner. Security though, Annette Seegers (2010: 264) argues, has to be defined; it must be given content or substance. And as Seegers (2010: 264) points out "… power defines security" and "… all regime types define security in a self-interested, often anti-democratic manner" (2010: 267). How security is defined is in many cases the result of a dualistic process, an interplay, between a debate on security by academia in the scholarly environment and an executive function of government in the policy process. The problem is that officials and politicians are invariably biased; they cannot be objective in defining security (Wolfers 1952). In the definition of security, both the academic and the policy processes have to contend with two variables: domestic or internal vulnerabilities and threats from the outside, dangers lurking in the outer environment. Of course, the notions of security and threat perception, and of security and defence planning, are by implication adversarially defined; they are directed by the impossibility of overcoming uncertainty about the future when shaping the people, processes, and technologies for the security and defence of a nation; they are deeply-rooted human endeavours that are influenced by the political and bureaucratic preferences and values of those involved; and they are exercises in relativity — one only needs to be "good enough" to be successful, that is, better than the adversary (this is the central thesis of Gray 2014).

Defence and military capabilities are, besides the security agenda, the other key ingredient of the security and defence planning processes (see Wilson 2003). Capabilities are developed against the backdrop of domestic political agendas. In contrast, though, the security agenda unfolds against the background of both the international political realm and domestic political environment. Thus, Buzan (1991) describes the
threat perception as part of the new security agenda in terms of the interplay between international derived external threats and domestic or internal vulnerabilities. The idea of a security paradigm, doctrine or perception in this article is defined inclusively in terms of both threats and vulnerabilities.

Perceptions of security and threats are derived from historical experience, political, strategic and contextual factors — geography for example — and are influenced by assumptions about the need for security and defence planning (Horelick 1974: 196). Obviously, defence and security decision-making are made easier in the presence of an obvious and clear security threat. Much harder are defence policy decisions in the absence of a clearly defined threat to security. Security and defence planning conducted under such circumstances is often subject to questionable assumptions and driven by domestic politics rather than strategic purpose (Mandel 1994: 54-55).

The historian, Ian van der Waag, in his recently published book *The Military History of Modern South Africa* (2015), observes that very little has changed in the South African threat perception since the creation of modern South Africa through the formation of the Union in 1910. There was, firstly, always a non-African power or powers with the ability to project force intercontinentally that influenced South African security thinking and defence preparation. At various times before the First World War, South African threat perception had to contend with the intentions of Germany, Italy and France. After the Second World War the South African threat perception was dominated by the role of the USSR and Cuba, whilst countries like Britain and France influenced South African defence capabilities and preparation. Secondly, the possibility of a landward invasion from Africa seems to be a constant feature on the South African threat agenda. Immediately after the creation of the Union, there was the possibility of an invasion by a colonial power with imperial intentions. After the First World War the focus shifted to the possibility of an African revolt against colonial rule. In the Cold War era there was the threat of "... a possible Pan-African army formed by a coalition of newly liberated states" (Van der Waag 2015: 2). Thirdly, the possibility of an internal uprising has been a constant feature of the South African threat perception. The people or groups involved and their motivations shifted over time — from the Afrikaners, the English, the poor white working classes, to the black population and various ethnic groups. Of course, the priority assigned
to each one of the threats over time was largely influenced by the ruling government's outlook on security.

Before democratisation in 1994 the South African security and threat agenda was dominated by what one may call the three war framework: the Cold War; the wars of decolonisation in Africa; and the anti-apartheid struggle. South African involvement in the Angolan war unfolded against the backdrop of the Cold War in Africa. As a colonial and occupying power in Namibia, the South African counterinsurgency campaign against the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) inside Namibia was conducted in the context of a war of decolonisation in Africa. Whilst these two wars were fought outside the country, the real threat to the apartheid regime unfolded inside the country in the fight against apartheid (Moorcraft 1990). From a security perspective, the struggle against apartheid was the key factor in the development of the idea of a 'total onslaught' and, as a consequence, the formulation of the so-called 'total strategy' to counter such an onslaught (Alden 1996). Both the ideas of 'total onslaught' and 'total strategy', as a matter of irony, necessitated a comprehensive (total) understanding of security. However, the securitisation of all sectors of society and programmes of government led to the militarisation of the South African society in general and its government in particular.

2. Human security in perspective: Theoretical debates, changes and trends

Since the early 1990s, the South African definition of security, its threat agenda and, as a consequence, its defence preparations were predominantly shaped, firstly, by the theoretical reconceptualisation of security as both a scholarly and practical construct and, secondly, as a result of this reconceptualisation of security, a reconfiguration of the role of the military in society.

The theoretical reconceptualisation of security coincided not only with the democratisation process inside South Africa; but also with the end of the Cold War and the publication of the United Nations (UN) Developmental Report 1994 (United Nations Development Programme 1994). The end of the Cold War was seen by many to usher a new era in world politics. The security reconceptualisation of the early 1990s was informed by a need to broaden and deepen the thinking about the
threat agenda to make room for domestic challenges on the national security agenda and to also include threats of a non-military nature; in fact, to demilitarise the idea of security. The UN publication of the Human Development Report 1994 introduced the notion of human security as an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities and people-centred development as an alternative to the more traditional notion of national and military security. The report argues, firstly, that the search for human security lies in development, not in arms (United Nations Development Programme 1994: 1), and, secondly, that threats to human security are no longer just personal, local, or national. They are becoming global (United Nations Development Programme 1994: 2).

In South Africa, with its history of armed conflict, human rights abuses, and societal dysfunctionalities under apartheid, the new African National Congress (ANC) government provided fertile ground for "...the new compulsions of human security" (United Nations Development Programme 1994: iii). More specifically, the ANC government in South Africa had to contend with the same challenges outlined in the Report as part of the human security agenda. "For most people today", it is noted in the Report, "a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime — these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world" (United Nations Development Programme 1994: 3). This line of argumentation was also reflected in the 1994 ANC election manifesto (African National Congress 2011). The Military Research Group, the Institute for Defence Policy (IDP) and the Centre for Conflict Resolutions were the key drivers of the new security agenda in South Africa. Motivated by the demands of a government requesting assistance and the supply of activists and donors seeking influence, the military became a key driver of the new security agenda. In the end, the new security agenda and now largely accounting for human security was presented in "African" language as different "...calabashes of security" (Seegers 2010: 269, 272).

The broadening of the security agenda was based inter alia on the assumption that the role and utility of military power was expected to decline in international politics in the era immediately after the Cold War. For some it was the end of history — meaning the end of war — while for others it meant that military force had largely lost its usefulness
as a means of policy (Betts 1997: 7). The broadening and deepening of the security agenda, also in South Africa, was not without consequence. For the more traditional, realist-oriented strategic studies specialist it was soon quite clear that strategy as an organising concept and strategic studies as a scholarly discipline may be at risk.  

Snyder (2008: 3) noted that "... the intellectual coherence of strategic studies increases with linkage to the military core, but institutional status and legitimacy grow with distance from it". To rephrase, linkages to security on the one hand provide strategic studies as a scholarly discipline with political and societal legitimacy. The conceptual link between strategic and military studies, on the other hand, provides security as an organising concept with scholarly focus and intellectual coherence. Legitimacy, however, does not necessarily mean a specific approach to security will succeed as a policy and strategy (Seegers 2010: 264). The tension is quite obvious: the notion of security is liberalising strategic studies as an academic discipline while military studies are dragging it back into the realist paradigm.

The tension unfolds along two lines. Firstly, the broadening of security as an organising concept may risk equating security with the interests and the well-being of society in general and, by implication, brings "... potentially everything that might negatively affect human affairs" into the realm of security, that is, securitise societal problems that are not necessarily to be securitised. As such, security may jeopardise its value as an organising concept by risking to become "... too broad to be of any practical value" (Baylis and Wirtz 2010: 13). The problem is not that the concept of security lacks meaning, Colin Gray argues, but rather that it carries so much meaning that it is thoroughly undisciplined. The 'potent' idea of security, Gray then notes, is potentially boundary-free and overflowing with meaning to everyone, both individually and collectively. Moreover, Gray (2015: 11) argues persuasively that security may be based on feelings of security and, as a consequence, is liable to "... influence by personality and mood swing chemistry and consideration or circumstances, but scarcely at all reliably by empirical data". Seegers (2010: 264) argues along similar lines that a wide security mandate "... contains anti-democratic potential equal to, if not greater than, the problems produced by a narrow notion of security". More specifically, security as a concept is inherently subjective and open for abuse by politicians, public opinion-makers and even academics. As a result, though security may be an important con-
cept in international politics and statecraft, it is possible to argue that it is also rather unmanageable for the student of strategy.

Secondly, there is an inherent risk that those who are responsible for and interested in security may lose sight of the military by choosing to deliberately ignore the military core of security. Any deliberation of security necessitates careful attention of and to the military sphere of security. Military power remains an essential element of security, irrespective of the width or depth of the definition of security. Security cannot be studied or conceptualised by ignoring the contribution or potential destructive role of the military; the most important or, at least, one of the main actors and areas in the security domain (Baylis and Wirtz 2010: 13).

Like the end of both the First and the Second World Wars, the end of the Cold War led to a reconsideration of the role of the military in society and the conceptualisation of the threats to and nature of security (see Baldwin 1995 for an outline in this regard). Like the previous immediate post-war eras, security again replaced strategy after the Cold War as a more appropriate concept of analysis; and security studies replaced strategic studies as a more legitimate academic discipline. Strategy was seen as too narrow and increasingly irrelevant at a time when interstate regular wars are in decline and security interests and threats are increasing in diversity and complexity (see Gray 2005 and Van Creveld 2008). Security was portrayed as a more valuable and robust organising framework for the complexity and variety of multidimensional dangers facing strategic actors around the world (Baylis and Wirtz 2010: 13). The close relationship between strategic studies and the realist paradigm made the incorporation of domestic security affairs and human security somewhat of a challenge. Security studies in the 1990s, thus, reflected a progressive agenda; there was a strong normative, a slightly utopian and idealistic outlook, visible in most security writing.

However, contemporary security thinking could not afford to ignore the intrinsic value of military power in and for international security. While security thinking during the 1990s became fairly idealistic in nature, conflict flared up around the world in, amongst others, Africa, Kuwait and Iraq (1990/1991), and the Balkans. Moreover, the 9/11 attacks and the wars that followed in its wake, together with the growing involvement of military forces in the maintenance of peace world-wide, "... demonstrated all too clearly that military force remains a ubiquitous
The realisation that military power remains a significant feature of world politics was accompanied by an understanding that military power has utility across the whole so-called conflict spectrum — from high-intensity warfare to peace missions and post-conflict reconstruction. James Burk (2002: 29) argued very aptly in this regard that "... the military profession's role has expanded over the course of the last century, widening from the management of violence early in the century to encompass the management of defence following the Second World War and the management of peace after the Cold War". The result was a more balanced and realistic contemplation and scholarly consideration of international security and the role of military force in particular in the second decade after the Cold War. More specifically, it is possible to argue that, because of its potential to explain many of the observed phenomena in the security domain, strategic studies is again gaining credibility as a field of study in the post-9/11 world. In the aftermath of the Western military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the central and recurring strategic challenge seems to be driven by questions about when, where and how to use military force for strategic effect (Gray 2011). This is even more of a debated issue with Russian military involvement in places like the Crimean Peninsula, the Ukraine and Syria (see, for example, Van der Vyfer 2015).

At the same time, the well-being of society and the security of the state it belongs to cannot and must not be entrusted or surrendered to the military bureaucrats and, by implication, emphasise the military dimension as experienced in South Africa during the apartheid era. The golden rule, Colin Gray (2014: 7) argues, is that the military power of the state must always be subjected to authority that is accepted very widely as legitimate. The reality, and ultimately the strategic challenge, is the inadequate understanding, incomplete conceptualisation and poor framing of security and strategic predicaments by the public political will. This is the core of the problem and extends to politicians and armed forces alike. One of the key lessons of the post-9/11 conflicts seems to be that the nature of societies, their cultural and ethical foundations matter in and for the conceptualisation of security, and the effective projection and use of force.

In the post-Cold War era, and the era following on the 9/11 attacks in particular, military bureaucracies experience acute institutional disequilibrium between the demands for military action in support
of both domestic and foreign policy initiatives and the growing instability in defence budgets and the availability of resources. Defence budgets worldwide were cut to the bone in the 1990s with the high demand for the so-called peace dividend in the aftermath of the Cold War. The growing demand for military action since 2000 vividly exposed the shortcomings and paucity of means of defence establishments, especially in the developing world.

Bureaucracy has staying power and, as bureaucratic professions, militaries find it extremely difficult to downsize the bureaucratic component of their profession. The large standing militaries of the Cold War developed relatively large bureaucratic command and control structures for quick expansion in case of emergency. Large numbers of officers were 'carried' in middle-management appointments at the rank level of lieutenant-colonel and colonel. The result was that many militaries ended up with relatively large headquarter and training establishments at the end of the 1980s that many, because of the nature of bureaucracies, find extremely difficult and painful to dismantled in the 1990s (Van Creveld 1990 provides an in-depth outline of this phenomenon). Unemployment and the growing unionisation of democratic workforces, together with the rising impact of the juridicratic and mediacratic nature of democracies, require militaries to maintain a relatively large bureaucratic support structure.

3. Between policy and reality: The SANDF and human security

Since 1994, a wide variety of policy and strategic documents have been approved by the South African policy-makers to effect the necessary changes in the South African security outlook. These include, amongst others, the 1996 Defence White Paper, the two Defence Reviews published since 1994, the working documents of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), and the White Paper on South African Participation in Peacekeeping. Of these, the 1996 Defence White Paper is of particular interest. It was not only the first policy document in the security domain since democratisation in 1994; it also clearly articulated the security outlook and threat perception of the newly elected ANC government.

Two key issues from the 1996 White Paper on Defence should
be highlighted for the purposes of the article. The first, inward focus reality is that South Africa's national security "… is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters. At the heart of this new approach is a paramount concern with the security of people" (South African Government 1996: Chapter 2, par 11.1). Stated differently, human security became the new defining framework for the defence establishment in South Africa. The second is an outward focused fact that South Africa is pursuing peaceful relations with other states through political, economic and military cooperation and that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is primarily defensive in orientation and posture (South African Government 1996: Chapter 2, par 11.4). In fact, the White Paper deliberately played down the need for a warfighting capacity in the SANDF through an emphasis on the principles of non-offensive defence and non-threatening defence (see Jordaan and Esterhuyse 2008).

The ANC, in 1994, inherited a country in which militarisation had been institutionalised in the white component of the population. The apartheid system was not only built on the support of the white voting population; it also had full control over the weapon arsenals, the security forces and structures of government. The biggest part of South Africa's white population served and received military, paramilitary, or police training in one way or another and most of them were still involved in the reserve and security forces. Even the police was regimentalised and employed in counterinsurgency operations in South Africa and Namibia. That is not to say that the South African security forces were an all-white security outfit; a large group of volunteers from the other population groups also served in the military. The point to make, though, is that a section of the South African society was highly militarised.

The predominantly black African component of the South African population, in contrast, had been exposed to widespread violence, firstly, in the fight against apartheid and, secondly, in violence between different political groups inside the country. Ethnicity and race was exploited by both the apartheid government and those fighting the apartheid system, in an effort to divide and rule in the case of the former and to make the country ungovernable for the apartheid regime in the case of the latter. Since the Soweto Uprising in 1976 a whole generation of predominantly black youth has been exposed to and
have grown up in communities in which very high levels of violence was a reality. Many have been absorbed in the underground structures of the revolutionary movements; other were just swept away by waves of continuous violence in the various neighbourhoods as stone throwers and as part of the process of mass mobilisation to destabilise apartheid South Africa. Needless to say, for those fighting the apartheid government, there were very little restrictions on violence (this is a central thesis of the book by Jeffrey 2009).

As a result, the Mandela administration, in the period immediately after 1994, was confronted with the reality of taking control of a country that was, on the one hand, highly militarised and, on the other hand, conditioned by very high levels of institutionalised violence. The ANC was also confronted with the reality of change from being a populist revolutionary movement to a democratic political party; from making a country ungovernable to governing a deeply divided South African society. Given the ruling ANC’s background and history, it was expected to take control of the South African security forces and demilitarise those they considered to be opposing them. There was, at the same time, an implicit acceptance that as a political movement it had control over its own cadres and constituency. In reality, though, the security forces had control over their weapon arsenals and were relatively disciplined and professional to international standards. However, the military had been deployed inside the country and was racially based, that is, not representative of the South African society in general.

The Mandela administration, in the interest of regime security, deliberately had to restructure the military, replace the white top structure, and end the domestic deployment of the military (see my discussion of these processes in Esterhuyse 2010). The demilitarisation of society was endeavoured through the new security agenda. Human security became the new security buzzword for government and those involved in the study and operationalisation of security in society. Embedded in the acceptance of the human security paradigm, was the implicit belief by the South African government that, firstly, never again would South Africa be a military threat to its fellow African brothers who assisted them in the struggle against apartheid, nor would South Africa be threatened militarily by Africa in general (see, for example, Department of International Relations and Cooperation undated). Military power, and the destructive manner in which it was used by the apart-
heid government in particular, the ANC government assumed, had lost its utility for the post-1994 New South Africa. The role for the military in operationalising both the domestic and the foreign policy of the country was downplayed to the level of nonexistence. Secondly, given the country's foreign policy construction at the time, around the persona of President Mandela, the country’s security challenges were framed predominantly in the context of non-military domestic socio-economic vulnerabilities.

Today, it is generally accepted that the Mandela-era was a honeymoon period for South Africa (see, for example, Munusamy 2014). For the military, the reality turned out quite different and, from a threat and security perspective, in two particular ways. Firstly, the country quickly turned peace into an export product and its military became an important carrier of the message of peace in Africa. Peace missions in Africa became an important feature on the South African defence agenda. It is somewhat idealistic to think a country will be involved in peace missions without being seen by some as part of the problem; turning destabilising actors into enemies — as was clearly demonstrated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with the M23 rebel movement (see the most recent paper by Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman on dichotomies of South Africa's foreign policy in Africa: Alden and Schoeman 2015). The idea that the SANDF can be a military without an offensive fighting, force projection, intervention and expeditionary capability, as was alluded to in the 1996 White Paper on Defence, turns out to be an illusion; as was clearly demonstrated through the 2013 military episode in the Central African Republic (CAR) (see Jordaan and Esterhuyse 2008 for an outline in this regard).

Secondly, the post-1994 domestic security situation turns out to be a major challenge for the South African security forces. Government tried to demilitarise society through efforts such as the dismantling of the commando system, the implementation of highly bureaucratic gun-ownership regulations, and the ending of military involvement in border control and other domestic security endeavours. However, enough illegal guns were widely available in society in general that — together with drivers such as the deeply ingrained culture of violence, economic and income inequality, and a feeling of relative deprivation in many sectors of the South African society — turned South Africa into a utopia for criminals. Extremely high levels of violent and well-organised crime became a challenge for the police to handle on their own. This was
augmented by a somewhat paranoiac fear from government of a possible white right-wing uprising. The 2010 Soccer World Cup, in particular, facilitated the return of military involvement to the domestic security agenda. However, the role of the military in domestic security operations is very carefully managed and restricted to operations such as highly specialised organised crime operations, counter-poaching operations, and border protection.  

For the South African military, three particular trends influenced its strategic outlook and capacity. The first is the drastic cut of the defence budget as part of the demand for a peace dividend in the 1990s. There is general agreement amongst military and strategic specialists that the South African military is underfunded (see, for example, AAFonline 2014 and Anon 2015). The second is the SANDF's inability to downsize the huge bureaucratic structures that were developed for the apartheid military's large reserve army. The unionisation of the SANDF, together with the general juridicratic and mediacratic nature of modern militaries in democratic societies, led to an increase in bureaucratic structures and an inability to implement an up-or-out personnel management system. The result is a very small deployable footprint, a general lack of operational agility and the SANDF's inability to project force and sustain multiple operational deployments over extended periods of time (see South African Government 2014).  

Both these factors were exacerbated by a third consideration — the military in South Africa became, if not the most, then one of the most progressive advocates of the human security paradigm. The military institutionalised the human security agenda through the Executive National Security Programme (ENSP) of the South African National Defence College (SANDC) in Pretoria. The ENSP was to a large extent designed with human security as its foundational concept. Like the 'total onslaught' and 'total strategy' constructions of the apartheid military, human security became the defining notion of thinking about security in the SANDF. For more than ten years, senior officers were inculcated with, and their minds shaped, by means of the theory on human security. It is quite interesting, for example, to attend the annual briefing by the students on Exercise SIVUKILE, the capstone exercise of the ENSP at the SANDC. The findings of the exercise, which is supposed to integrate all the deductions and conclusions of the briefings and discussions of the ENSP in one final presentation, are almost exclusively of a non-military socio-economic, and sometimes also political, nature.
The question pertaining to what this means for the mandate, equipment, institutional, cultural, personnel and operational formation of the South African military is not debated in-depth. It is one thing to understand that South African threat and security challenges are of a human security nature; it is another to debate what it actually means for the defence establishment, that is, what the role of the Defence Force should be in supporting that particular agenda, and how it should organise and equip itself for that role. It may be good news for the general public to know that its military is primarily concerned with the state of the South African democracy and the socio-economic make-up and development of the country. At the same time, though, the findings do raise questions about the SANDC’s, and by implication also the SANDF’s, relinquishment of its primary role — to reflect on the defence of the Republic. The ENSP functioned and was focused within the framework of economics, politics and security instead, as is the case with similar colleges around the world, the framework of defence, security and politics; defence was taken out of the curriculum of the Defence College and replaced with human security. It seems as if the SANDC has fallen prey to the inherent risk in the security debate of deliberately ignoring the military core of security. If senior officers of the SANDF are not given the tools to deliberate South Africa’s military establishment and defence at the SANDC, where and by whom is it being done? This matter goes to the heart of what the ANC apparently believes the purpose of defence to be: maintaining societal legitimacy, employing the masses, and enhancing national prestige — most of which contribute to domestic human security, rather than attending to the traditional interests of the state. The existence of such an archetype also explains why the South African government apparently sees much utility in ‘employing’ (and sometimes ‘deploying’) the ‘armed forces’, but seems unable to grasp the value of ‘developing military force/power’ pro-actively, in support of foreign policy objectives and national interests. The human security agenda of the South African military had a number of far-reaching consequences. Firstly, there are limitations to the military’s ability to contribute to the human security agenda. In fact, Ferreira and Henk (2009) argue that the apartheid conscript military, made up of a wide spectrum of professions and with its counter-insurgency mind-set, was better equipped for human security operations and peace support operations than the current SANDF. Thus, the
SANDF paid lip service to the idea of human security, but its ability to operationalise the idea was practically non-existent; restricted almost to the employment of as many people as possible irrespective of whether they are medically fit and operationally deployable. Within the South African military, anything robust, hard power, selective, tough and demanding — link to offensive use of the armed forces — is taboo.

Secondly, the notion of human security provided the South African military with a political outlook and a somewhat safe haven within which the military leadership could hide from the need to present a clearly defined and explicitly motivated military mandate for the SANDF to government. The political legitimacy and acceptability of human security became the converging notion in the interplay between the somewhat politically-minded military leadership of the SANDF \( ^{11} \) the ANC as a political party \( ^{12} \) and the ANC as the government of South Africa. Stated differently, human security tied the SANDF into government without the need for both governmental and military leadership to make important decisions about military trade-offs in strategic focus, institutional re-alignment, procurement, ethos, force preparation and military effectiveness.\(^{13}\) Conceptually, human security presented both the SANDF leadership and the political office bearers in South Africa with a sanctuary to hide from tough decisions about defence. The result is an alarming ignorance of the role of military force and the utility thereof.\(^{14}\) Moreover, you cannot expect the military to place a high emphasis on the non-military dimensions of security and the domestic security agenda and expect the institution and its members, especially its leadership that has been specifically oriented towards human security, to remain aloof from domestic leadership, political and other disputes. Impartiality and non-partisanship are unlikely, if not totally impossible in such a scenario (Seegers 2010).

Thirdly, the human security agenda had political consequences for the military; the military presented political office bearers with divergent appreciations and images of the role and function of the military. On the one hand, the military communicated a strong message, rooted in the human security agenda, that South Africa’s problems are of a non-military and mostly socio-economic and socio-political nature. In a sense, the military justifies its own marginalisation and the relative small size of the current defence budget; the underlying message being that the military had only a small role, if any, to play in securing the South African society. On the other hand, though, the military's primary responsibility
was constitutionally defined as territorial defence. As a result, the SANDF tried to maintain its conventional warfighting capability and, at the same time, the military also became involved in peace operations in various African countries. In monetary terms, these two activities are extremely expensive — both in its operational and capital dimensions. The nature of these expenses was not accounted for in the defence budget. These expenses led the military into a continuous process of political lobbying for a bigger portion of the national budget for defence but, without the security and threat agenda to justify such a budget. The result is a military that is falling apart between over-commitment, lack of capability and a conceptual framework that does not correspond with operational realities.\footnote{15}

4. Conclusion

The end of the Cold War coincided with the process of democratisation in South Africa. The immediate post-war era was characterised by a reconsideration of the concept of security through a broadening and deepening of the concept. The idea of human-orientated security, in particular, was introduced through the \textit{UN Developmental Report 1994}. Security replaced strategy as the primary driver of thinking about threats and the strategic environment; security studies replaced strategic studies. The end of the Cold War was not the end of history and the end of conflict and war that many hoped it would be. Thus, the world at large experienced a return of more traditional thinking about defence and security at the beginning of the second decade after the Cold War. Nowhere was this more evident than in the wars that followed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in New York and elsewhere, the unfolding of conflict in areas like the Middle East and Africa and in Russia's return as a major player in the domain of security. In South Africa, though, the framing of the security agenda remained set in the human security paradigm; though its foreign policy and defence and military activities are telling another story.

Since 1994, a deliberate effort has been made to institutionalise the human security agenda as the primary security paradigm for thinking about defence and security in the South African military. The outcome of the security definitional process, though, is highly unpredictable. South Africa experienced the policy-driven idea of total security turning our society into a highly securitised and militarised entity; and
the scholarly-driven idea of human security increasingly being transformed into regime security. The suitability and appropriateness of human security as an organising framework for the armed forces is highly problematic — and in the case of the South African military, for two specific reasons. Firstly, the South African armed forces did not in fact at any time critically question how a military should be organised, trained, and equipped for human security operations. As a matter of irony, the South African military, and the officers that went through the ENSP at the South African National Defence College in particular, were schooled in utilising the human security framework as a way of understanding South Africa's complex, multidimensional and multi-layered socio-economic, political, cultural and other challenges. However, in the process the College neglected to lead their learners down the pathway to deliberate the ends, ways and means to operationalise human security in the defence and military realms through re-organisation, re-equipping and retraining for human security operations. Is the procurement of, for example, air superiority fighter aircraft, submarines, and corvette surface ships, procured under the so-called Strategic Defence Package, typical equipment for a military engaged in human security operations? In short, the values contained in the new human security paradigm were widely accepted in the leadership structure of the South African military but the question as to what exactly human security means for and in the defence realm was never entertained.

Secondly, the SANDF has never questioned its own operational deployments through the human security perspective. What operations should armed forces typically engage in to operationalise the human security paradigm? Is the conduct of peace missions a typical human security operation? Is the employment of the military in counter-poaching, crime fighting and border protection the kinds of operations that ought to be conducted within the human security paradigm? Can South Africa justify its offensive operations in places like the CAR and the DRC under the banner of human security? What kind of human security operations should be conducted by the South African armed forces to protect and extend South Africa's political and economic interests in Africa and beyond?

Endnotes

1. Continue the reference here.
University, and visiting lecturer at the South Africa National Defence College.

2. The University of South Africa closed their Department of Strategic Studies and the University of Pretoria amalgamated their Institute for Strategic Studies.

3. Demarcating the increasing influence and role of the courts and the judiciary in general in the governing of modern democracies and the functioning the bureaucracy.

4. Demarcating the expanding influence and role of the media — in all its formats — in the governing of modern democracies and the functioning of the bureaucracy.

5. This was explicitly outlined in the 1996 White Paper on Defence and is still implicit in the working documents of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).

6. E-mail correspondence with a senior officer of the Joint Operations Division of the SANDF, 15 October 2015. It is also clear from government's unwillingness to use the military to calm potential political instabilities that government is highly sensitive about the domestic employment of the military. The farmworker strike in the Western Cape and the Western Cape Government's request to deploy the military serve as good examples in this regard.

7. This is one of the key themes in the 2014 Defence Review of the Department of Defence and Military Veterans.

8. The author does not want to overstate the role of the SANDC in the professional preparation of senior officers and, at the same time, downplays their military experience and training that brought them to the SANDC. At the same time, though, it is important to give recognition to the fact that the SANDC is preparing senior officers for high command in the security realm and that their understanding of the security realm will be important in providing content to the notion of security in South Africa.

9. In some countries it is referred to as "War Colleges" and in other as "Defence Colleges". It is the apex institution of militaries throughout the world at which officers are developed and groomed for so-called high command — the top leadership positions of the military.

10. An issue that was discussed between myself, Roland Henwood from the University of Pretoria and a member of the Directing Staff of the SANDC at the 2014 briefing on Exercise SUMBANDILA, Pretoria, 3 December 2015.

11. The logical result of the SANDF's senior leadership military background in the revolutionary forces fighting the apartheid government and the inherent nature of revolutionary forces around the world.

12. Normally associated with Luthuli House as the political headquarters of the ANC as a political party.
13. I need to thank a senior official in the South African Secretariat of Defence for bringing this important matter under my attention, 20 October 2015.

14. My colleagues, Prof Francois Vreÿ and Mr Evert Jordaan, were very helpful in the development of this argument.

15. An issue that was discussed between myself, Roland Henwood from the University of Pretoria and a member of the Directing Staff of the SANDC at the 2014 briefing on Exercise SIVUKILE, Pretoria, 3 December 2014.

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