

## The Legitimisation of Peace Negotiations: A Non-Exclusive Role for Civil Society Actors

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‘Diplomats can generate an agreement, but without some form of public involvement it is not possible to know whether the agreement is legitimate’ (Ron 2010, 354).

Setting out to conduct my doctoral research on the link between participative or ‘locally owned’ peace processes and their link to peace sustainability, I was surprised with the results of my first empirical fieldwork. The literature to date had assumed that because of the participation of members of civil society, peace agreements become more sustainable (e.g. Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). This, the authors argue, is at least partly due to the fact that as a result of civil society participation there is ‘public buy-in’ ensuring the legitimacy and the implementation of the peace agreement. Nevertheless, during my fieldwork in Liberia, a case where civil society had a particularly proactive engagement throughout the entire peace process, I found that neither interview partners nor focus groups discussant knew much about the role of civil society actors or in fact the negotiations themselves. I began to question what public buy-in or legitimacy actually means and what this has to do with the knowledge of a process. What had started out as a question of representation and local ownership was no longer feasible without taking a step back. How exactly does public buy-in work? And when does a process of negotiations become more legitimate? This paper presents one element of my doctoral research, pointing to a more complex role for civil society actors in terms of legitimising negotiations or mediation processes than often presumed - on the basis of my second empirical case study: Kenya.

Wanis St. John and Darren Kew show a correlation between high civil society involvement in negotiations and durable peace (2008). Their findings are further complemented by a statistical study from Nilsson (2012), who using data from 83 peace agreements shows that the inclusion of civil society actors increases the durability of peace. Nilsson concludes that ‘when wider spectra of civil society become involved in a peace process this can increase [the] legitimacy of the process, which in turn may contribute to durable peace’ (2012, 263). Because it is not possible to invite all members of the aggrieved population to participate in peace negotiations, civil society actors become the representatives of the population (Call 2012, 269; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). There are both normative and practical reasons for the

argumentation that civil society leads to more sustainable peace. Normatively, the inherent right for the aggrieved population to participate through civil society representation is proposed (Barnes 2002; McKeon 2004; Paffenholz 2014; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). There is in fact also a legal foundation to this normative idea. The universal right to take part in governance either directly or through representation is codified under Article 21 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since agreements often create new political structures and relationships, the right to participate can be argued as applicable in this instance (Barnes 2002; McKeon 2004). The participation of civil society actors is also argued to lead to a societal ownership of the peace agreements since people feel like they are included, which has a positive effect on sustainable peace (Barnes 2002, 11–12; Donais 2009; Edwards 2009, 70; Jarstad 2008b, 127; McKeon 2004, 6; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 18; see also Prendergast and Plumb 2002, 328).

Several practical reasons are additionally proposed by the literature on the topic, including the influence on the conflict parties and content of the agreement, the effect there is on the transformation of social relationships and the pressure for implementation which results because of civil society participation. In more detail, firstly, it is argued that civil society has a particular capacity to influence conflict actors so that they sign an agreement in the first place and holds them accountable (Belloni 2008; McKeon 2004, 571; Nilsson 2012, 250; Paffenholz 2014, 74; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 24). Related to this, the inclusion of civil society will avoid leaving out any potential ‘spoilers’ in the future (Nilsson 2012, 250; Nilsson and Kovacs 2005; Paffenholz 2014, 73; Sriram and Zahar 2009, 23). Secondly, because of civil society participation a ‘public agenda’ is included in the agreement, improving the content of the agreement (Barnes 2002, 12; Odendaal 2010, 20; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 23). This also relates to the expertise and knowledge assigned to civil society (Paffenholz 2014, 74). Thirdly, in the long-term societal relationships are transformed, which leads to a reorientation of society (away from violent conflict divisions) and as a result further improves the chances of sustainable peace (Barnes 2002, 12; Hemmer et al. 2006, 133; Jessop, Aljets, and Chacko 2008). Lastly, because of the participation of civil society actors there are greater chances for implementation (Bell and O’Rourke 2007, 301; Jarstad 2008b, 127; McClintock and Nahimana 2008, 90; McKeon 2004, 5; Nilsson 2012, 247; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 23).

The likelihood of implementation, aside from the greater accountability to conflict actors, is primarily linked to the idea of ‘public buy-in,’ which is a side effect of greater participation and the inclusion of a ‘public agenda.’ The idea of ‘public buy-in’ is interlinked to legitimacy whereby ‘engaging civil society... can promote ... a sense that the negotiations have greater legitimacy, which can lead, in turn, to a shift in public opinion about the process’ (Paffenholz 2014, 74; see also Belloni 2008, 199; Nilsson 2012, 247). This makes it a circular argument: Public buy-in results in legitimacy, and because of legitimacy there is public buy-in. In fact, links are made to legitimacy by several authors, yet the exact mechanisms of how

legitimation works in practice has been left unaddressed by this research. Instead, vague statements are made like 'broader participations means more legitimacy' (McKeon 2004), there is 'increased legitimacy ... through inclusion of civil society' (Belloni 2008, 199) or 'effective participation ... made a difference in the legitimacy' (Barnes 2002, 12). This dyad of participation (through civil society representation) and legitimacy has become a common presumption not only amongst scholars looking specifically at the role of civil society in peace negotiations, but beyond. Most of the literature which has followed has concentrated on the degree and timing of involvement for civil society actors.

This direction of research relates back to a second major finding in the civil society-participation research, which argues that the less democratic the country where the peace negotiations take place is, the more important the role of civil society actors (Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 12). Two research interests have followed as a result: On the vertical dilemma of inclusion (as a problem) and different ways of inclusion (as a solution). The vertical dilemma relates to the fact that inclusion enhances legitimacy (though how is unclear) but reduces efficacy (Jarstad 2008a, 23; see also Belloni 2008, 183). At worst, including too many extra actors at negotiations can lead to a 'cognitive overload' as effective communication deteriorates (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 21). In addition, it could result in a reduction in the number of concessions offered to conflict parties, giving them altogether fewer incentives to stop fighting (Cunningham 2011, 215–218). Accordingly, the question of who gets a seat at the table and when has become a crucial one (McClintock and Nahimana 2008, 75). Because of the vertical dilemma of inclusion and the democracy argument it has been argued that civil society does not necessarily need to be formally included in the peace negotiations, but can have multiple and alternative (types) roles, even after the peace agreement has been signed (e.g. Jarstad 2008a). This research on the different types of roles has since been the focus of most of the recent work and has been repeatedly argued as an area for future research (Barnes 2002; Hemmer et al. 2006; Nilsson 2012, 263; Paffenholz 2014).<sup>1</sup> The inherent contradiction is of course that the less democratic a country is, the more difficult it becomes for a vibrant and strong civil society sector to develop and grow (Belloni 2008, 208; see also Chabal 1994, 86). The practicalities of civil society activism in a war or post-war context further accentuates this problem (Christie 2012, 194; Donais 2012, 10; Spurk 2010, 18). In effect it becomes a chicken or egg situation - is civil society a source or a product of a well functioning state (Donais 2012, 67)?

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<sup>1</sup> The different ways and time periods of participation are also discussed in the peacebuilding process more broadly (Paffenholz et al. 2010; see also Kanyinga 2011, 88). A variety of different participation models have been proposed including: Consultations, representation /representative decision-making at the talks and direct participation (Nilsson 2012, 248) which is quite similar to representative participation (through political parties), consultative mechanisms (civil society has an opportunity to voice views and formulate recommendations) and direct participation (interested individuals involved) (Barnes 2002, 8) or monitoring, advocacy, socialization, social cohesion, facilitation, and service delivery (Paffenholz et al. 2010; Pearce 2011, 412). Most recently, Thania Paffenholz proposes nine models of participation: Direct representation of civil society groups at the negotiation table, observer status, official consultative forums that run parallel to official negotiations, less formal consultations, inclusive post-agreement mechanisms high-level civil society initiatives, public participation, public decision making and mass action (2014; see also Spurk 2010, 24).

There are several shortcomings in the previous literature that equally merit attention, related to theoretical and conceptual assumptions as well as methodological limitations. Firstly, there are serious theoretical assumptions being made between ‘public buy-in’ and legitimacy and sustainable peace as result of this. Secondly, and related to this, the current understanding of legitimacy and the legitimisation of peace negotiations is superficial. Amit Ron also problematizes that the public sphere in peace processes is under-theorized (2007, 3). There are further conceptual assumptions being made about the kind of civil society and levels of influence they potentially have, save for some exceptions like a discussion on the different types of civil society in Burundi (e.g. McClintock and Nahimana 2008) or more broadly speaking the paradox of civil society in peacebuilding (Christie 2012, 194). Lastly, the literature to date has been methodologically limited to one basic correlation and statistic analysis (Nilsson 2012 respectively; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008), individual case studies and for the large part - grey literature and policy documents on the matter (e.g. Ramsbotham and Wennmann 2014). Little attention has been paid to analysing empirical sources beyond the elite actors that are involved. As Andreas Mehler surmises ‘an effort to ask communities about their sense of the problems and the legitimacy of those sitting at the table ... cannot be detected’ (2009, 472). Whilst he is speaking of the legitimacy of the conflict parties at the table, the same can be said about the question concerning the role of civil society actors and the effect this has on the legitimisation of the talks.

In summary, whilst the research on the type of role for civil society and the link to sustainable peace is no doubt of great significance, without an understanding of peace negotiations become more legitimate, theoretical and conceptual assumptions are being made. Looking at how peace negotiations become more legitimate is a multifaceted question that cannot be detailed in its entirety here. Earlier attempts have focused primarily on questions of representation of civil society actors (e.g. Zanker 2013, 2014), whereas the focus of this paper is on the overall legitimisation of negotiations. Detailing two aspects – namely the non-exclusive role of civil society actors in the legitimisation process and the resultant two-fold dimensions of legitimisations serves to show the complexity of the question of representation and legitimacy in mediation processes.

A few words of introduction must be said on the topic of legitimacy. The research illustrated in parts in this paper, considers how peace negotiations become (more) legitimate. Legitimate peace negotiations are equated to a process of legitimisation. This is because peace negotiations are conceptualised as an ad-hoc, dynamic and non-institutionalised process. Peace negotiations do not simply become legitimate or not one day, when the peace agreement is signed, but more or less legitimacy is achieved in a *process of legitimisation*. The legitimisation process considers all the different factors or components that together make this ad-hoc, dynamic and non-institutionalised process of peace negotiations more legitimate. Scholars working on procedures as advancing legitimacy, speak of the legitimisation of procedures (e.g. Luhmann 1983). I

differentiate between legitimisation and legitimation however, in order to contrast the *legitimation* of a process with the *legitimation of individual actors* (such as civil society representatives). Individual actors will legitimate themselves, i.e. show or argue for their own legitimacy, but this does not on its own translate into the entire process of legitimisation. In other words, one part of the legitimisation process may be individual actors that are legitimate or can legitimate themselves, but this is not the whole process. Calling it a process of legitimation like other scholars do, would risk conflating a partial component with the overall process.

The legitimation of the individual civil society actors gives way to two further accentuations - the beneficiaries and the guarantors of legitimacy. That is, the legitimisation process is not only in part made up of the legitimation of individual actors, or individually legitimate actors, but also the whole idea of considering how peace negotiations are made more legitimate is to consider the interaction with the general population. Accordingly, firstly, there are people who gains or benefit from the legitimate actors and the legitimisation process itself (*the beneficiaries of legitimacy*), mainly relating back to the general population, who as is shown throughout the research are both passive and more active in this role. Secondly, there are those that act on behalf of the beneficiaries of legitimacy or the general population: *The guarantors of legitimacy*. This relates mainly to the civil society actors involved in the peace negotiations, but also beyond this as is shown in this paper.

In the following, the Kenyan negotiations after the post-election violence in 2008 will be introduced before discussing the symbolic nature of the AU Mediation Panel and other forms of participation through what I call participative communication. The repercussions that result from this will then be outlined, before introducing the two dimensions of legitimisation – in the public arena and at the negotiations.

### **The Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation**

Since the first Kenyan multiparty elections in 1992, there has been some form of election-related violence nearly every five years. The reason for this pattern resides in historical conflict divisions between different tribes, particularly concerning land and unequal distribution of resources. The worst incident of post-election violence occurred in 2007/8, as a result of the announcement of a disputed presidential election result in favour of the Party of National Unity (PNU) candidate Mwai Kibaki, as opposed to earlier predictions for the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) candidate Raila Odinga. Over 1,000 people died and up to 500,000 were displaced. Whilst most violence was largely in terms of ODM versus PNU supporters, or along ethnic lines, e.g. (*inter alia*) Kalenjin/Luo vs. Kikuyu, it was not exclusively so. Violence was also about poverty, unemployment and the manipulation of young people and criminal gangs (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009).

A multitude of mediation efforts ensued during the Kenyan post-election violence, which had quickly gained international attention. These included initial efforts by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, as well as parallel mediation from various former presidents from Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique. In addition there were efforts from the Ghanaian President John Kufuor (as AU Chairman) and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni (as Chairman of the East African Community). When Kufuor's own efforts, and that of his preparation team, proved to be inconclusive, he wrote to former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan asking him to take on the role of African Union (AU) Special Advisor and Chief Mediator. The AU's Panel of Eminent African Personalities therefore took on key responsibility, chaired by Annan, along with former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa and former first lady from Mozambique and South Africa Graça Machel. Their mediation efforts began on the 22<sup>nd</sup> January 2008, with the technical support of various UN bodies and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Instead of one agreement, four documents known as agendas were signed as a result of the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR).

On the 1<sup>st</sup> February 2008, Agenda 1 was signed which put a stop to the violence. It set up a commission of enquiry (later known as the Waki Commission) and the possibility of a special Tribunal to be set up to decide on the criminal responsibility of those involved in the violence.<sup>2</sup> The second Agenda, signed a day later, addressed the humanitarian crisis that had come about as a result of the post-election violence, namely the high number of internally displaced people. After six weeks of negotiations and a five hour 'end game', in what was seen as a triumph of African diplomacy, Agenda 3 was signed. This was perhaps the most important agenda, setting up a power-sharing interim coalition government, creating the position of Prime Minister, given to Raila Odinga, with Mwai Kibaki as President. The KNDR was used as a chance to discuss long-term grievances. Mediated, after the departure of Annan by Nigerian Foreign Minister Oluyemi Adeniji, it led to Agenda 4, signed on the 4<sup>th</sup> March 2008. Agenda 4 addressed legal, constitutional and institutional reform; poverty and inequality; unemployment; land reforms; national cohesion and unity, as well as accountability and impunity.

Civil society groups played a variety of roles in the KNDR, but never as official delegates. They gave a mix of technical support, advocating certain positions to the mediation team and lobbying to the public. A complete overview of the actions of civil society organisations is not possible here; nonetheless two coalitions of civil society groups must be mentioned. One of these was the Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP). This group was formed immediately after the post-election violence started, on the 31<sup>st</sup> December 2008. Their media engagement, prayers for peace, dialogue with different actors and getting a leading

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<sup>2</sup> This was never done and thus a sealed envelope was passed on the ICC by Annan. Six people were indicted by the ICC of which four were confirmed on the 23<sup>rd</sup> January 2012. By the time of writing (2015) all charges have been dropped or cases collapsed, bar that against two persons: today's Vice President of Kenya, William Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, a radio journalist.

mobile phone operator to send an SMS to all their subscribers urging them to be peaceful, were complemented by their Open Forum. Through the Open Forum they developed a Citizens Agenda for Peace which they presented to the mediators. Formed from peacebuilding community and religious groups, their main goal was for peace to return to the country. They held their discussions in the Serena Hotel, the same place where Annan chose to conduct most of his mediation. Some meetings chaired by Annan took place next door to the Coalition's meeting, allowing for close interaction with the group and the negotiation process (Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 28). The coalition is said to have brought the crisis to international attention (by for example calling for the early mediation attempt by Desmond Tutu) and to have impacted the agenda of the mediations. This is especially the case for Agenda 1 (e.g. Kanyinga 2011, 94–101; Mwagiru 2008, 30, 51; Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 11, 23). The second coalition was called Kenyans for Peace, Truth and Justice (KPTJ), formed by a variety of groups including the Kenyan human rights lobby, who petitioned for accountability and justice, calling for a recount of votes. They called on the conflict parties to agree to an international mediation. Using partners like the Red Cross they developed an accurate count of the deaths that occurred, and collected data on violence. Resolutions proposed by the US, UK and EU opted for a similar language and approaches to those suggested by the KPTJ. Their innovative actions included for example one member of the KPTJ, the Kenyan Private Sector Association, meeting with Kibaki and threatening that businesses would withhold taxes unless he agreed to negotiations. Like CCP, they regularly engaged with the AU Panel. They are said to have been highly influential in forming Agenda 4 (Kanyinga 2011, 94–104).

The KNDR illustrates two important elements of what makes negotiations more legitimate than the current literature on the topic has not sufficiently addressed. Firstly, the symbolic nature of actors beyond the civil society actors which play a role in the legitimisation process – namely the mediation team. Secondly, the expanded notion of participation beyond civil society representation, which is illustrated by what I call participative communication. These two elements will be detailed in the following sections.

### **A Legitimate Mediation Team**

The leadership under the African Union is said to have 'deepened the legitimacy of the entire mediation process' (Kanyinga and Walker 2013, 8). The KNDR talks were feted as a success of an African-led mediation of African unity as a trump to national exceptionalism (Baldauf 2008a; Jepson et al. 2014, 236; Khadiagala 2008, 10). Symbolically, this meant a reliance on the notion of 'African solutions' for 'African problems'. Thus, it was the local and Kenyan Red Cross chapter that led the coordination of humanitarian relief and not the UN or an international relief agency (Wanyeki 2010, 3–4). Moreover, the AU Panel itself evoked an imaginary of African elders - the final negotiation round prior to the peace agreement involved 'five elders for five hours ... all that was missing was the village tree' (Cohen 2008). At one point Graça Machel tells the negotiation room that her husband, Nelson Mandela, sends his wishes and 'sought to

remind them that all of Africa was watching the process' (Cohen 2008; Odinga also remembers this in his autobiography; see Odinga and Elderkin 2013, 882). Kufuor initially proposed the AU Panel and its members to 'assist the Kenyan brothers and sisters' (Jepson et al. 2014, 21) and Annan himself thought that the Kenyan parties would be more likely to invest in the process if the intervention came from a fellow African state rather than the US or UK (Cohen 2008; see also Jepson et al. 2014, 235–236; Annan and Griffiths 2009, 2; Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 189). In summary, 'the mandate was African, the panellists were African, and the style of the negotiation ... was as African as a village council' (Jepson et al. 2014, 236). Annan personified the mediations within the symbolic framing under African unity. One recollection underscores this, in a rather dramatic evocation of the talks:

'On one night, as the two teams strain to hear the soft-spoken Annan explain a point, a group of elephants leave the watering hole and creep up close to the lodge, as if they want to listen, too' (Baldauf 2008c; see also Jepson et al. 2014, 243).

Kofi Annan made some very clear indications of his own role in the process as particularly unique. In the foreword to a recent book on the KNDR, he states: 'My deep engagement with this country turned into a labour of love - love for the Kenyan people and a fervent desire to see them achieve an enduring peace and prosperity' (Kofi Annan in Jepson et al. 2014, xiii). Annan argues he was there to look for a solution, but a legitimate one where the grassroots would be involved through civil society actors. He reiterates this point on numerous occasions, wanting to keep the process as transparent as possible through engaging the media as well as many different civil society actors (e.g. Annan and Griffiths 2009, 2; Connan 2008, 330; Jepson et al. 2014, 232).

Additionally, Annan personally links himself as a legitimate actor for the general population - a man acting for the benefit of 'the people'. On leaving Geneva making his way to Nairobi, he explains 'protecting Kenya and keeping Kenya together was foremost on my mind - *the people* are dying' (emphasis added here and throughout the following paragraph; Annan and Griffiths 2009, 18). Further, he opens the negotiations by stating that the AU Panel 'had come to serve Kenya, not just its masters' and wanted to 'make it [the process] accountable to those who are most affected by the conflict' (Jepson et al. 2014, 233). During the talks, Annan publically calls on the parties to conclude an agreement 'in the interest of Kenya and *its people*' (Jepson et al. 2014, 39) and starts each negotiation session with a prayer, including on one occasion, 'Lord, may you make the parties ... see that they have an obligation to find, in the interest of *all people of Kenya*, this one accord' (Cohen 2008; Jepson et al. 2014, 40). When pressuring on particular points, with the negotiation actors complaining 'you are pushing us, we are breathless', Annan retorts 'I'm pushing you because *people are dying*' (Annan and Griffiths 2009, 14). These self-appointed efforts of incorporating the grassroots perspective and grievances last throughout. He urges Kibaki to set up a compensation fund for victims (Annan and Griffiths 2009, 10) and after the power-sharing agreement had

been signed, Annan recalls, he did not feel triumphant: 'It had taken far too long. As they say in a Swahili proverb, "When the elephants fight it is the grass that suffers." This is what had happened with all the people killed around us' (Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 201).

Further, Annan staged symbolic events, most notably the initial handshake between the two principals Kibaki and Odinga after he first arrived (K2; see also Annan and Griffiths 2009, 4; Jepson et al. 2014, 233). This, he argued, was necessary to 'send a message to the people' and 'to quell the desperate atmosphere' (Annan and Griffiths 2009, 4; Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 192; Jepson et al. 2014, 25). Using positive language encouraged the conflict parties as well as helping to maintain public confidence (Jepson et al. 2014, 240). Adding to his own mythology, Annan called himself a 'prisoner of peace' during this time of negotiations, to symbolise how committed he was to staying in Kenya - despite his busy schedule - until a solution had been found (e.g. Annan and Griffiths 2009, 18; Cohen 2008; Khadiagala 2008, 10). The Chair was however careful to note that the ultimate responsibility was nevertheless with the political leaders in question since 'no outsider can want peace more than the Kenyans' (Baldauf 2008c; the Panel also urged the government to cover the cost of the negotiation as a sign for Kenyan responsibility; see Jepson et al. 2014, 33). Nevertheless, Annan was celebrated as the 'saviour of the nation' (Khadiagala 2008, 25). He motivated his role as the 'prisoner of peace' by wanting to enact the responsibility to protect, R2P, in order to deepen a legacy he had first started working on when UN Secretary General (Cohen 2008; Jepson et al. 2014, 235–236). Deeply hurt by what had happened during the Rwandan genocide over a decade earlier, he was using this occasion to make amend and to show that through R2P things could be different (Cohen 2008).

Annan goes to some length to publicise his position of legitimacy, showing his own legitimisation strategy. More than that however, this self-referential legitimisation is widely perceived as such. In his autobiography, Annan recalls and quotes at length from an open letter published in a newspaper in early February 2008, which had moved him deeply. The letter writer states:

'I ... feel like a little girl again, begging daddy not to leave her alone in the dark, because a monster will eat her. Annan, you have seen the monster in this country ravage its own ... you are the political-cum-peace mentor Kenyans never had. We endorsed your team long ago ... you and gracious Graça ... have struck a chord with Kenyans. You feel the suffering of the ordinary people' (Mburu 2008; see also Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013).

A number of observers back this up by for example stating 'Annan announced [on 14th February] that he was prepared to stay as long as it took ... to the people of Kenya for whom he had come to epitomize hope, this was a message that he was as invested in the future of Kenya *as they were*' (emphasis added, Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009, 17; see also Annan and Griffiths 2009, 18; R. Cohen 2008). This was also

repeated in interviews. “Kofi Annan was an acceptable personality to Africa, the international community and human rights activists” (K5), or, “when Kofi Annan came things were ok” (K4; see also K3). Out of six focus groups conducted in Kenya in the Rift Valley with teachers, youth and market women, five mention Kofi Annan specifically as someone who had addressed their grievances during the negotiations, see Table 1 below.

**Table 1: Who addressed your grievance at the peace talks? (Kenya 2011)**

Who addressed the grievances (listed) at the peace talks? <sup>3</sup>	
<b>Teachers Nakuru (KNT)</b>	Ministry of Education; Kofi Annan; Raila Odinga; Mwai Kibaki; William Ruto; Uhuru Kenyatta
<b>Youth Nakuru (KNY)</b>	ODM and PNU representatives, Jakaya Kikwete; Kofi Annan*; African Union president; civil society.
<b>Market Women Nakuru (KNM)</b>	Kofi Annan*; Graça Machel*; William Ruto; Martha Karua; James Orengo; Uhuru Kenyatta; Charity Ngilu (an MP)
<b>Market Women Eldoret (KEM)</b>	Kofi Annan*; Graça Machel*; Jakaya Kikwete*; Yoweri Museveni; Raila Odinga; Mwai Kibaki; Musalia Mudavadi; Martha Karua; William Ruto
<b>Teachers Eldoret (KET)</b>	Kofi Annan*; Graça Machel; Jakaya Kikwete; Benjamin Mkapa; William Ruto; Sally Kosgei(ODM); Musalia Mudavadi (ODM); Martha Karua (PNU); James Orengo (ODM); Sam Ongeru (PNU); Moses Wetang'ula (PNU)
<b>Youth Eldoret (KEY)</b>	Sally Kosgey; James Orengo; Martha Karua; William Ruto; Musalia Mudavadi; Raila Odinga; Mwai Kibaki; Jakaya Kikwete; Condoleeza Rice

\* These actors were thought to have been particularly concerned with the grievances that affected the participants themselves the most

Moreover, four of these groups further specified who out of all the actors that had addressed the grievances particularly had their concerns and grievances in mind: All of them mentioned Annan, either exclusively (KNY; KET) or in combination with other members of the AU Panel (KNM; KEM). In addition, the one group that not had listed Annan specifically, still noted the international mediators were those that had addressed their issues in contrast to their national politicians (KEY). One of the focus group participants amongst the market women in Eldoret elaborates: “If Kofi Annan never came, then peace could not have been achieved. His team was enough to solve these problems” (KEM; see also KEY). When South Consulting conducted a survey in 2010, 81% of respondents from the most affected areas of violence were satisfied with the performance of the ‘Kofi Annan Team’ (South Consulting 2010, 37).

<sup>3</sup> “What were the most important local issues during the post-election violence? Were these issues addressed in the negotiations of the peace agreement? Who addressed them?”

Annan was also widely praised by the international community, which further strengthened his symbolic position. Analysts suggest for example that Annan's very presence was one of the reasons that violence quickly reduced in February (Cohen 2008). In addition, his 'extraordinary skill and dedication', 'continental credibility', 'personal charisma' and 'moral authority' was widely praised and was the subject of much inquiry as an example of a successful mediation process (see for example Horowitz 2008, 8; Jepson et al. 2014, 233; 237; Khadiagala 2008, 10). In a published interview with Annan's co-worker at the Humanitarian Dialogue, his interviewer Martin Griffith finishes the interview by gushing '... [your] intuitive appreciation and insight ... [and] methodical planning ... was extraordinarily productive, magical, so congratulations' (Annan and Griffiths 2009, 18–19).

The accolades were not exclusively for Kofi Annan, but also for the entire AU Panel. Their role is thought to have been an invaluable one (Baldauf 2008b; Cohen 2008; Kanyinga and Walker 2013, 8). Annan's position was strengthened by the other panellists: Graça Machel and Benjamin Mkapa (Baldauf 2008a). Machel, was praised in particular for her connection to women and 'feminine stamina' and Mkapa for his regional expertise and familiarity with the principals and his charm and ease in communication (e.g. Khadiagala 2008, 10; KNM; KEM). Mkapa for example helped to translate important messages into Kiswahili at press conferences which meant a larger proportion of the population could be reached (Jepson et al. 2014, 29; 243). In addition, Machel had extensive knowledge of the Kenyan situation due to her previous work as part of the African Peer Review Mechanism. More symbolically, Machel was seen as 'the voice of passion and conscience' with a 'history of ... activism for the excluded (Jepson et al. 2014, 243; see also Baldauf 2008a; Mburu 2008). Machel stated that Kenya 'was divided and bleeding and that it was essential to bring the nation together in a place where all citizens had a sense of belonging' (see also Baldauf 2008a, 37). In fact, the entire Panel had a clear message that they were mediating a negotiation for the benefit of an entire country, not just the political class (Jepson et al. 2014, 31).

This was exemplified by a visit to some of the affected communities in the Rift Valley in order to see the scale of violence and destruction themselves. Machel hugged and cried with one of the women who had shared her story with her (Baldauf 2008a; see also Jepson et al. 2014, 25). Echoing the self-referential legitimisation narrative in Liberia, Machel was named 'the Mother of the Continent' in the previously cited open letter to a newspaper praising the AU Panel (Mburu 2008; see also Baldauf 2008a). There is, in summary, strong evidence to support the idea that the AU Panel itself evoked strong emotions of symbolic attachment, thus ensuring their place in becoming so-called guarantors of legitimacy, one element of the legitimisation process. The symbolic attachment goes beyond merely feeling represented illustrated by the images used to narrate his presence as 'the prisoner of peace' or 'saviour of the nation'. Moreover, interviewees stating things such as "when Kofi Annan came things were ok" (K4) and the focus groups testimonies: "If Kofi Annan never came, then peace could not have been achieved" (KEM; see also KEY) also reiterates the symbolic attachment given to Annan and the Panel as recognised


guarantors of legitimacy. According to this interpretation, the very presence of the Panel itself fundamentally shifted the possibility of finding a peaceful solution to end the post-election violence and come to a political power-sharing agreement. Before discussing the repercussions as a result of this, the second element of the legitimisation process that suggests a non-exclusive role for civil society actors will be discussed in the next section.

**Participative Communication**

A prominent civil society activist, Muthoni Wanyeki stresses that civil society actors ensure “legitimacy through participation” (K7). This does not merely amount to civil society representation as has been argued from the start. In fact, transparency and communication play a key part in the legitimisation process, as was discovered in the Liberian case that was briefly mentioned above. Such transparency and communication contains several elements itself, including the distribution of information, but in this section the focus is on what I call ‘participative communication’. Participative communication, which can be either dualistic or one-sided, supports an interaction between the process and the population through forms of communication, partially but not exclusively including civil society actors, which leads to a *feeling of involvement* in the negotiations, thus contributing to the overall legitimisation.

Dualistic participative communication is illustrated by the communicative engagement with the public at the behest of civil society actors, which contributes to circular information flows. The best example comes from the Open Forum conducted by the CCP. From this Open Forum, the Citizens Agenda for Peace was developed which was then presented to the mediators. The idea behind the Open Forum was that anyone who wanted to could attend and exchange thoughts, also called an ‘idea harvesting session’ (Concerned Citizens for Peace 2008, 2). Similar forums were also set up including the Nairobi Peace Forum, District Peace Forums and Listening Forums (Ibrahim Abdi 2009; Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 11). The open invitation to all makes this a participatory process that further contributes to a circular information flow: Listening allows for information on collective concerns to be gathered. This information was then fed into the mediation process through the regular meetings between the civil society actors and the mediators (see also ‘the Panel used what it heard;’ Jepson et al. 2014, 238). In turn, information on the mediation was then redistributed to the public through the media - both by the civil society actors and the AU Panel members, thus creating dualistic participative communication, see Figure 1 below.

**Figure 1: Circular Communication Flows for Dualistic Participative Communication**



This dualistic participative communication opens up the discourse in the peace negotiations to anyone in the public who wants to participate, at least theoretically. The event was described as asking ‘anyone interested in saving Kenya to come’ (Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 11), suggesting that through attending a role is played in helping to save Kenya, and thus contributes to a feeling of involvement. The dualistic participative communication constitutes a part of the legitimisation process by allowing for a feeling of involvement. ‘Public approval and advocacy gave these documents legitimacy’ (Jepson et al. 2014, 45). This statement makes the link between ‘public approval’, best ensured by the communication flow as described above, and the legitimacy of the agreement itself, presumably because of a feeling of involvement. The feeling of involvement is further illustrated by one-sided participative communication, which gives a sense of involvement simply by airing the grievances and explaining one owns suffering, whether symbolically, artistically or otherwise.

Participants in the focus groups in Kenya noted in a final reflection session that they felt they had benefited from participating in the discussions themselves as a “learning process“ and a documentation of their “grassroots experiences“ (e.g. KEN). This suggests that any forms of expressions or reflections on the negotiation process give a sense of being involved or heard - even if this is rather symbolically. The story of Graça Machel crying and hugging a woman who had told her of her experiences of violence was given as an example of showing the proximity of Machel to the population as well as being deemed an important event in itself (that the woman was able to express her grievance). The ‘spitting session’ organised by Machel at a meeting of women from both political divides also gave an opportunity for people to air their grievances; giving them the sense they were involved in contributing to the collection of mutual concerns or grievances. Machel had been pivotal in efforts that were made to try to come to a broader agenda in some of the groups, including at the Bi-Partisan Women’s Consultative Group, where she suggested a ‘spitting session’. During the inaugural meeting of the group, it was difficult to reach a consensus on the most important issues across ethnic and political splits. On the advice of Graça Machel the group narrated all the issues that they were dividing them (that made them want to ‘spit’ at each other) and were then able to come up with a common list of grievances (McGhie and Wamai 2011, 19). Similarly, in another instance, a meeting held by women groups two years after the negotiations was framed as follows:

‘Every story needed to be heard. Everyone needed to share their experiences in order for healing to begin. Everyone listened, cried and empathised. In the end there was a feeling of release, possibility of forgiveness and the beginning of healing as people hugged and comforted each other’ (Ringera 2014, 190).

This shows that the externalisation of grievances, worries and experiences adds to a feeling of involvement, which personally legitimises the negotiation process. On a more practical and formalised

level such expression of grievances took place within the framework of local peacebuilding dialogue (for examples of Local Peace Dialogues see e.g. Korir 2009; K1; K2; K6). Expressing grief and grievances as a form of participative communication allows for a shared experience or understanding.

The feeling of involvement as a component that constitutes a part of the legitimisation process is also shown by one-sided participative communication carried out through artistic expression. Examples of this include a photo exhibition ‘Kenya Burning’ which had been organised by an Arts Centre together with the CCP. A request was made to have these photos to be shown in the Parliament so that politicians would have to look at them as well (see Kahora 2008a, 79). This made the photo exhibition into a political event, trying to reiterate the responsibility of some of the MPs in the post-election violence. Furthermore, under the umbrella of the group which called itself ‘Concerned Kenyan Writers’ a physical and virtual forum was provided for citizens to come to grasp with what had happened (Kahora 2008a, 2008b; Wanyeki 2010, 5). Initial responses included interactions by authors – largely amongst the Kenyan middle class - through social media forums. In addition, a collection of fiction and non-fiction stories on the post-election violence was also printed in an annual Kenyan literary collection called *Kwani?*.

These reflections on what had happened and why, were published in two edited volumes from 2008. The editor of these two *Kwani?* editions, explains ‘we are in this business to tell the individual’s story as a citizen in the space called Kenya, his or her relationship to *serikali* or state or whatchamacallit ... rather than to build one-characteristical narratives from sound-bites of Big Men’ (Kahora 2008a, 9). This *confession* underlines the commitment to telling another story beyond that of the politicians, one about and involving citizens. The two volumes collect stories, reports, interviews, poems, drawings and photos, seeking out to record and analyse stories from all sides of the conflict: ‘From people who threw stones, and people who had stones thrown at them; from farmers and nurses and hustlers, Luos and Kikuyus and Kalenjin ... whatever name they went by, we wanted Kenyans *to speak for themselves*’ (emphasis added. Arno Kopecky in Kahora 2008b, 48). In a very different way, these efforts express a civilian counterbalance to the otherwise politicised process, by allowing for the experiences or sufferings experienced to be vocalised. With the aim of not forgetting what had happened in the short period of violence and reflecting on the bigger issues at stakes: ‘As writers ... we have to look at what happened in the full-face. If there is any single reason this all happened, it is because we have refused to see, hear or listen’ (Binyavanga Wainaina in Kahora 2008b, 17). Other forms of communication were also used including blogs, text messages and other forms of social media. Kenyans approached ‘social media as a way to get involved’ (Mäkinen and Kuira 2008, 329). Such documentation and expression helped to come to terms with what had happened (the violence) but also with the negotiation process and therefore constitutes a part of the legitimisation through feeling involved.

In conclusion, this one-sided type of participative communication enables the population to involve themselves in the process through expressing ideas, reflecting or more direct public engagement platforms. This gives a sense that the process goes beyond the immediate needs and claims to personal power of the major conflict parties and therefore constitutes a part of the legitimisation process. The repercussions this has for the literature on civil society participation in peace negotiations is discussed next.

### **The Non-Exclusive Role for Civil Society Actors**

The basis of the literature on which this research is based on, argues that when civil society takes part in peace negotiations, the negotiations become more legitimate and as a result the agreement that follows is more likely to last (e.g. Barnes 2002; Paffenholz 2014a; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). Sustainable peace is possible because of civil society involvement making the peace negotiations more legitimate. This research has questioned this idea, by discerning what exactly the legitimisation process entails. Importantly, the exclusive role of the civil society actors in the legitimisation process has been questioned. From the empirical case study it was shown that peace negotiations do not necessarily become more or less legitimate *solely* because of the involvement of civil society actors. Firstly, participation can also ensue through alternative ways to mere representation by civil society actors such as for example one-sided participative communication through the artistic expression of grievances. Secondly, other actors, including the mediators can also act as guarantors of legitimacy.

On the first point, the active role of the beneficiary of legitimacy in the legitimisation process as part of the participation-based characteristics is best highlighted by the elements of participative communication. In the Kenyan case, beneficiaries could feel involved in the negotiation process, constituting a part of the legitimisation process. This engagement happened in two ways. Either ordinary civilians could participate in the Open Forum set up by a civil society group, in order to air their grievances and help contribute to the Citizens Agenda for Peace. Alternatively, and this time with no civil society involvement, persons were involved in the process by simply expressing their concerns, impressions and reflections on the process artistically or otherwise. This included for example artistic forms of expressing narratives such as the Kenyan '*Kwami?*' books. In essence, this part of the legitimisation process comes from within. This also highlights a more pro-active role for the beneficiaries of legitimacy, who can involve themselves in the legitimisation process, rather than the somewhat passive notion of feeling represented.

The onus on participation through communication in contributing to legitimisation has been recognised by other scholars. In a completely different setting, Bougeanvilleans seeking independence from Papua New Guinea were recorded to have spent large parts of peace negotiations singing and praying. Volker Boege explains that these may be 'activities that, from a internationals' point of view, can easily be

misjudged as folkloristic ... [but] ... are expressions of commitment and trust and can be more powerful than mere spoken or written words,' in order to make the negotiations more 'acceptable and legitimate' (2012, 97). Subsequently, at least in part the empirical construction of legitimacy is related to participative communication, which does not necessitate the involvement of civil society actors at all.

In addition, when civil society actors do play a role, they are to a degree interchangeable. What matters is not so much who they are, but rather how they are perceived, amounting to being representative or recognised guarantors of legitimacy. In the Kenyan case, overwhelming evidence points to the recognition of a self-referential legitimisation narrative from Kofi Annan, the AU Panel and 'an African solution for an African problem.' The mediation team was perceived just as legitimate, if not more so, than the civil society actors. They were a recognised guarantor of legitimacy, and thus contributed a part in the legitimisation process. As a woman writes to a national newspaper 'we endorsed your team long ago ... you and gracious Graça [Machel] ... have struck a chord with Kenyans. You feel the suffering of the ordinary people' (Mburu 2008). In summary, civil society involvement in peace negotiations cannot be automatically equated to more legitimacy. The legitimisation process can involve actors as guarantors of legitimacy that are not civil society actors, and also involve communication channels that involve no guarantor of legitimacy at all.

This finding and theoretical conclusion also means a distancing from the literature on sources of legitimacy and legitimisation strategies, because they do not on their own give a holistic picture of the legitimisation process. For example, a (relatively) newer field of legitimacy research has emerged that considers the legitimisation of authority as an observable activity, through the study of self-justifying characteristics of rulers (Barker 2001). Authorities are engaged in activities of their own legitimisation. In my own work however, the self-referential legitimisation narrative shown above are not solely an activity of legitimisation or a strategy as such. The civil society actor or mediator has no time to work on a long legitimisation strategy to make herself seem more legitimate to the beneficiaries of legitimacy. Of course, the prior reputation of the actor plays a role, but when the ad-hoc, dynamic and non-institutionalised peace negotiations process starts, their self-referential legitimisation is either recognised or it is not. Though the legitimisation process itself goes beyond the time period of the negotiations themselves, this is still the key moment in the legitimisation process, and usually takes no longer than a matter of weeks or months. This makes the legitimisation narratives of the guarantors different to legitimisation strategies used by authorities or leaders to enforce their own legitimacy over much longer periods of time (Barker 2001; Schatzberg 2001). In other words, whilst a study of the narratives as a strategy might help explain reasons why the actors are perceived as legitimate (as mothers, as 'African peers'), they do not by itself explain the legitimisation process.

The same limitation goes for the literature on the sources of legitimacy (e.g. Weber 1978). Considering the sources of legitimacy of actors may help to provide an understanding of why certain actors are perceived as legitimate, related to reasons of history, tradition, charisma etc., but on its own this does not offer a theory of the broader legitimisation process. Both the empirical approaches to legitimacy by Weber, Easton and the more normative approach by Beetham, all consider legitimacy in terms of persons of authority and power and how this justified - be it empirically, legally, morally, or normatively. Whilst civil society actors play a role - though not an omnipotent one - they are not by any means formalised or in positions of power or authority. In fact, by their very definition these are non-powerful actors in the negotiations setting, representing the population. Thus, the legal validity of power (as discussed by Beetham 1991); the structural sources of legitimacy (as proposed by Easton 1965) and the rational-legal source of legitimacy (Weber 1978) can simply not apply here. However, the personal source of legitimacy which Easton proposes along with Weber's personal sources of legitimacy, both traditional and charismatic, go some way to showing why specific actors come to be perceived as legitimate. The charismatic nature of some of the civil society actors and other legitimate actors is beyond doubt, including Kofi Annan in Kenya. Since the civil society actors are not equated to outright legitimacy however, as has been shown above, the literature reviewed is nonetheless only partially relevant.


### **Final Remarks: Two Dimensions of Legitimation**

Existing literature differentiates between Track I and Track II negotiations and the different types of roles that civil society actors can play (e.g. Barnes 2002; Paffenholz 2014a; Paffenholz, Kew, and Wanis-St. John 2006). Empirically however, in terms of the legitimisation process, there was not much difference in whether there was a direct seat or not at the negotiations table. In fact, legitimisation occurs both at the negotiations (whether formally or informally) and as part what is taking place in the broader public arena. In Kenya, both the formal and informal setting and the public arena are all located in the same country, even largely in Nairobi, and to an extent in one hotel - the Serena Hotel. It was in this place where most of the negotiations took place, where the CCP met and where the Open Forum was conducted. The spatial boundaries of legitimisation are not necessarily in a single geographic place however, like Kenya, or Nairobi or one hotel, or even in a particular space of legitimisation, i.e. at the formal talks or informally. Rather, the legitimisation occurs simultaneously in two dimensions - the negotiation and in the wider public arena, as shown in Figure 2 below.

One way of considering the public arena comes from revisiting Easton's system analysis of political life. One of the major 'categories' of his system analysis is what he calls the environment. He argues that we should think of political life 'as a system of behaviour *embedded in an environment* to the influences of which the political system is exposed and in turn reacts' (emphasis added, Easton 1965, 18). This includes both intra-societal environments (ecological system, biological system, personality system, social system) and extra-societal environments (international political system, international ecological system, international

social system) (Easton 1965, 21–25). Whilst some parts of his idea of environment adds more to the context factors, which have been outlined throughout the chapters, the notion is useful because of his argumentation that what he calls the political system is ‘adaptive and need not just react in a passive or sponge-like way to the environmental influences’ (Easton 1965, 18). This confirms the interaction between the two dimensions where legitimisation occurs - both at the negotiations and in the public arena. Additionally, by arguing that the legitimisation process occurs both with reference to the negotiations and the public arena, the fluid, moving and constructed space of the legitimisation process is underlined.

**Figure 2: The Two Dimensions of Legitimation**



To illustrate empirically, expert reports from civil society at the official talks in Kenya played an important role in ensuring a civilian counterbalance at the talks.<sup>4</sup> This makes a strong case for the fact that a differentiation between a Track I, Track II or even a purely informal role, does not necessarily make much of a difference on the levels of influence actors can have in ensuring the unfolding of a civilian counterbalance as part of the legitimisation process. Moreover, many of the actions resulting in the civilian counterbalance took place informally, surrounding the negotiations. In Kenya, informal influence on the peace talks was for example played out by a light-hearted threat to lock in Mkapa into his hotel room by some members of CCP, unless he agreed to stay for the mediation. The journalist Scott Baldauf, who had unique access to the proceedings, describes rather illustratively how this informal influence played out:

“Then, there's a knock on his [Benjamin Mkapa, Member of the AU Panel] hotel door. It's Lazaro Sumbeiywo, a retired Kenyan general, and Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, a Kenyan career diplomat, both of whom helped mediate an end to Sudan's 20-year civil war. "You are not leaving," General Sumbeiywo tells Mkapa. "Now that we have got this problem, you will not leave. You have to get in touch with our leaders to agree to international mediation. We held him hostage in this hotel," Sumbeiywo recalls, with a chuckle. He had no doubt that Kenya needed international intervention to resolve the political impasse. It would start with Mkapa.”(Baldauf 2008c).

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<sup>4</sup> Arguments for a civilian counterbalance in the legitimisation process are detailed elsewhere, for an early development of the idea see what I call ‘substantive representation’ in Zanker 2013.

With regards to participative communication previously discussed, because the circular communication flows relate back to the formal negotiation space, as was shown in the case of the Open Forum, this constitutes an integral component of the legitimisation process both with respect to the negotiation context and the public arena. Lastly, feeling represented or recognising guarantors of legitimacy all takes place in this public setting, not as part of the negotiations. The same can be said for feeling involved, with the exception of dualistic participative communication. As described above, the Open Forum and the circular communication flows of dualistic participative communication show an interaction between the dimensions of negotiations and the public arena.

Most importantly, the legitimisation in the negotiations occurs in a similar manner whether there is a direct seat at the table or not, i.e. as Track I or Track II actors respectively. In Kenya, civil society actors did not have a direct seat at the negotiation. Yet, a civilian counterbalance still resulted from the more indirect role of the Kenyan civil society actors, who lobbied the conflict actors and the negotiations far from the official table. The type of role played by civil society actors in the negotiations also does not hold particular results for the legitimisation in the public arena. The Kenyan civil society sector was not part of the talks directly, and there was a reduced sense of feeling represented. Nonetheless, due to their expertise they were also at least partially perceived as recognised guarantors of legitimacy. In addition, the lack of feeling represented was counteracted by the mediation team in Kenya (Kofi Annan and the AU Panel) who were perceived to have been recognised guarantors of legitimacy.

The legitimacy of peace negotiations or a mediation process has the possibility of affecting the sustainability of peace. It is therefore an area of research which merits further attention. Whilst much excellent and important research has been done on the role of civil society actors and the informal dimensions of negotiations, revisiting this research in terms of the empirical, theoretical and conceptual repercussions for the legitimacy of the process is highly salient. Detailing two aspects – namely the non-exclusive role of civil society actors in the legitimisation process and the resultant two-fold dimensions of legitimisations serves to show the complexity of the question of representation and legitimacy in mediations or negotiations.

## List of Cited Interviews and Focus Groups

Interviewee / Focus Groups	Code	Date	Location
Local Government Administration Official	K1	24/10/2011	Nakuru
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member	K2	07/11/2011	Eldoret
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member	K3	08/11/2011	Eldoret
Elected Eldoret Town Councillor	K4	23/11/2011	Eldoret
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights	K5	30/11/2011	Nairobi
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member	K6	08/12/2011	Nairobi
Muthoni Wanyeki	K7	30/01/2015	Phone
Focus Group Discussion Teachers (9 participants)	KNT	26/10/2011	Nakuru
Focus Group Discussion Youth (10 participants)	KNY	27/10/2011	Nakuru
Focus Group Discussion Market Women (10 participants)	KNM	28/10/2011	Nakuru
Focus Group Discussion Market Women (9 participants)	KEM	17/11/2011	Eldoret
Focus Group Discussion Teachers (7 participants)	KET	18/11/2011	Eldoret
Focus Group Discussion Youth (7 participants)	KEY	19/11/2011	Eldoret

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